the DB Q Principles of Terrorism

the DB Q Principles of Terrorism

What assessments might AQ have made in deciding the type of attack to employ, the targets of the attack, and particularly the timing of the attack? That is, what were they gambling that they were assessing correctly in launching the Madrid attack? Would the timing have been different if they had wanted to attack the United States with the same methodology for the same reasons visà-vis the timing they chose in Spain? How might they have assessed Americans differently? If they would have assessed Americans differently, if they were going to launch the identical attack, how might the timing of that attack been changed based on U.S. cultural characteristics, voting trends and general national history? My posts Terror groups consider a number of factors during planning stages of every attack operation before execution (Gill, 2018). During planning stages, the group considers three main factors; prevailing security measures, combat intelligence, potential number of casualties. These factors influence the decision on the type of attack to employ, the targets of the attack, and particularly the timing of the attack. In the Madrid attack, the proprietor, AQ were basically gambling about where exactly to launch the attack, at what time, and using which method. AQ had a perfect timing striking at 7:37 AM on four trains within the city center (Library, 2019). Due to the perfect time and the right choice of method used, the attack resulted in more than 190 deaths and about 2,000 casualties. Prevailing security measures in place determines the location and the method to be used during an attack. If the security measures are so tight, the executors would resolve to less noticeable methods that cannot be easily intercepted. Has evident after the Madrid attack, the Spanish intelligence system failed much below the standards failing to deter such a major attack. In addition, the attack exposed serious challenges in the coordination between law enforcement agencies in Spain and insufficiencies in international cooperation. Executing an identical attack in the US could prove more challenging owing to the level of intelligence. With the same methodology, the chances of success could be very minimal. Combat intelligence is a crucial factor for terrorists for the successful execution of terror attacks. This entails the detailed information regarding the target i.e. the prevailing security measures at the target, the methodology of attack that will be appropriate, and the expected number of casualties among others. In the Madrid attack, AQ had detailed intelligence regarding the attack. They knew that elections were going to be held and minimal security measures will be directed towards terrorist attacks. No one would consider a commuter train a target (LópezFonseca, 2019). In addition, they compromised the Spanish miners who facilitated the explosives to be used in the bombing attacks. With respect to United States, retrieving combat intelligence proves difficult for AQ. For instance, from September 9/11, it took approximately 7 years for AQ to hit US using a different methodology of attack. A potential number of casualties is another factor considered by the AQ during the Madrid attack. Several citizens used a commuter train to go in and out of Madrid. Hitting such a train could yield a devasting number of deaths and casualties. After the attack, 193 deaths and more than 2000 casualties were reported. The bombing attack was considered the deadliest attack in the history of Spain since 1988. Considering the timing of the attack three days before a general election, it is evident that AQ’s underlying intention was to create confusion and suspicion among the Spaniards. To some extent, the attack achieved this objective as the immediate response was counter blame between the major political parties Partido Popular (PP) and Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) (Canel, 2010). The same rhetoric could apply in the US between Republican Party and the Democratic Party, cultural characteristics and general national history notwithstanding. References Canel, M. J., & Sanders, K. (2010). Crisis communication and terrorist attacks: framing a response to the 2004 Madrid bombings and 2005 London bombings. The handbook of crisis communication, 449-466. Gill, P. M. (2018). Terrorist decision making in the context of risk, attack planning, and attack commission. . Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 1-16. Library, C. (2019). Spain Train Bombings Fast Facts. Retrieved 18 October 2019, from https://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/04/world/europe/spain-train-bombings-fastfacts/index.html López-Fonseca, Ó. (2019). Fifteen years on from the Madrid bombings, where are the perpetrators?. Retrieved 18 October 2019, from https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/03/11/inenglish/1552291654_033183.html 1 First, a review of our definition of terrorism: A premeditated act of violence, real or threatened, from an ideologically-driven non-state group or individual towards civilians or any non-military personnel to inspire fear and influence the decisions of an entity. In our definition, we can see that our target can only be non-combatants. Target choice is influenced by our best guess of what type of domino effect our attack will have on swaying the opinion of the populace or state. The method of terror is a culmination of group talent, supplies on hand, and the tactical challenges presented by the target. Davis (2013) includes military targets provided the intent is for demoralizing the citizens, ostensibly, to erode the state’s internal support. While Davis’s position makes sense to us, the ability to parse out guerilla warfare from terrorism in real-time seems murky. There is a sense of this blurred line in the Chechen mass hostage siege of Kizlyar in the Republic of Dagestan in 1996. At the outset, Chechen fighters attacked an air force base to destroy helicopters before moving on to take hostages in a local hospital (Giduck, 2011, p. 179). Disabling air support from an opposing military group appears to us as a sound guerilla strategy. The leader of the Chechen fighters, Salman Raduyev, permitted media access into the hospital and revealed a more familiar theme of terrorism in an interview; “How many aircraft and Russian soldiers came to Chechnya, and how many came from the land of Dagestan? The Dagestani people have not yet learned what war it. Now you will feel it (Giduck, 2011, p. 190).” It is reasonable that Dagestani citizens were chosen as a target to highlight the suffering of Chechens in war as well as provide an incentive for Dagestanis to withdraw support for the Russian campaign. The 2004 Madrid train bombing conducted by Al Qaeda (AQ) was developed from conception to be held before the national elections (Neo, Khader, Ang, Ong, & Tan, 2017). Internal AQ literature supposed the Spanish people would not endure a series of attacks, forcing the government of Spain to withdraw from Iraq (Neo et al., 2017). The gamble for AQ was the thin resolve of the Spanish people to remain committed to military involvement in Iraq. The timing of the bombing ahead of an election presented the political machinery of Spain with the challenge of navigating the best course to re-election. Al Qaeda was credited with a successful bombing as the voters in Spain chose the candidate who promised to withdraw troops from Iraq (Rose, Murphy, & Abrahms, 2017). Given the upcoming United States presidential election in 2020 that is already confounded by a democratic platform of multiple candidates along with an incumbent currently in an impeachment process, we argue that an excellent window for a decisive terror attack. The withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan would bolster the selfperception of AQ and the Taliban, who already view themselves as victors over the Soviet Union (Lewis, 2003). Looking to our recollection of the history of 9/11, we believe the risk posed to AQ by a new attack on U.S. soil is a solidification of national unity and the support for a military offensive that would follow. Much as the Russian response to Chechen rebels was more severe on repeated encounters (Giduck, 2011, p. 210), it is possible that the American public would tolerate harsher tactics against AQ. The guiding concept of AQ’s interpretation of Islam poses the West as detractors of fundamental Islamic values (Lewis, 2003, p.82). Nightclubs are reasonable targets as patrons dancing with each other serve as symbols of Western immorality, and intoxicated people could be viewed as easier to subjugate. We can expect AQ to build off of the knowledge of previous attacks, as this fits with the teaching doctrine of Khalid Sheik Mohammed (Giduck, 2011, p. 264). It is interesting to ponder if AQ was too successful with the attacks on September 11th, as any new attack has to be on the same magnitude or more significant. We see any lesser offensive as a connotation of diminished strength. An essential requirement for terrorism is media coverage, which grants it with coverage (Giduck, 2011, p. 57). We offer a comparison with the Boston Marathon bombings, where the emergency responder system was already in position for a rapid response. In an evolution of the Christchurch shooter who streamed his attack on Facebook (a medium not available in 2001), we propose a target choice based on readily available media coverage for maximum impact. The most viewed television event in the U.S. is the Superbowl (yes, Wikipedia) that yields national television coverage along with attendees with cellphone devices. The Super Bowl has the properties of large crowds, significant financial investments, and a stadium surrounded by parking lot, which makes it defensible (Giduck, 2011, p. 272). We feel, however, that the modern sporting event is a hardened target. Tactics involving female suicide bombers are a possibility as the U.S. has not experienced any, and they can make it past traditional pat-downs (Davis, 2013). We also offer the image of a mass hostage siege during the Oscars or similar Hollywood events. The viewership for last the 2019 Oscars was 29.6 million (Otterson, 2019). It is our perception that the killing of beloved movie stars, especially those that portray warriors on film, would generate unique psychological distress. Davis, J. (2013). Evolution of the global jihad: Female suicide bombers in Iraq. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36(4), 279-291. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2013.763598 Giduck, J. (2011). When Terror Returns. United States of America: Archangel Group, Inc. Lewis, D. (2003). The Crisis of Islam. New York: Random House. Neo, L. S., Khader, M., Ang, J., Ong, G., & Tan, E. (2017). Developing an early screening guide for jihadi terrorism: A behavioural analysis of 30 terror attacks. Security Journal, 30(1), 227-246. doi:10.1057/sj.2014.44 2 The Madrid attacks of 2004 were a carefully planned terrorist operation conducted by AlQaeda, in which ten bombs were detonated almost at the same time in different trains of Madrid. This happened only three days before the Spanish general elections, and it was supposed to be in retaliation for Spain’s involvement in the occupation of Iraq, according to the terrorists. Interestingly, there was a document that circulated on the internet, which was an Islamist strategic guide to deal with the Iraq invasion, and in this document, the author referred to the upcoming Spanish elections. This document called for jihadists to take into account the political calendar of Western countries when planning attacks. It is not clear whether this document is linked to the actual Madrid attack, but there is enough evidence to claim that it is part of a strategy that circulated among Islamists at the time: the strategy of attacking with a particular timing in order to influence Western politics (Lia & Hegghammer, 2004). The goal of Al-Qaeda in the Madrid attack was to influence the Spanish election so that people would choose the candidate who opposed the occupation of Iraq and the alliance with the United States in this occupation. They chose as targets civilians in the capital city, because that would cause excellent media attention, and because there is a large concentration of voters in that area. The timing was three days before the election, probably because they were hoping that apathetic or undecided voters would be terrified and decide right away to vote for the opposition. Research shows that Madrid attack did affect the Spanish congressional election, and the conservative party lost despite having been high up in the polls before the attack (Montalvo, 2011). The reelection of Republican President George Bush happened three years after the 9/11 attacks. George Bush strongly supported military interventions in the Middle East, especially after the World Trade Center attack. This indicates that Americans tend to choose to stay with a more aggressive anti-Islamist government after an Islamist attack. However, three years is different to three days, and the outcome may have been different if the American elections were only three days after the attack. I believe that the American and Spanish mentalities are very different regarding terrorism and the way to respond to terrorism based on the Bush reelection and the Spanish choosing the opposition after the Madrid attack. Another difference between the Spanish and American situations if their respective positions in the war against Islamist terrorism: The United States is the most significant world potency, and it had historically been involved in conflicts in the Middle East, whereas Spain is a small country and the Spanish people probably felt that they were fighting an American war and paying for it with their own people’s deaths. Therefore, the Spanish thought it was not worth it to continue fighting the American war and chose a different path. If Al-Qaeda wanted to launch an attack against the United States in order to influence the elections, they would probably not be successful. The current American administration is in favor of withdrawing troops from the Middle East, which is the kind of government AlQaeda had in mind when they attacked Madrid. Therefore, they would want to keep the Republicans in office in current times. References: Lia, B., & Hegghammer, T. (2004). Jihadi strategic studies: The alleged Al Qaida policy study preceding the Madrid bombings. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 27(5), 355–375. doi: 10.1080/10576100490483642

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